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Abstract: 
 
Most readers believe Grotius failed to refute Socinus in De satisfactione. This paper 
argues that Grotius's failure was one of reception rather than argument.  It is possible to 
read De satisfactione as Grotius adverted: a genuine (if subtle) concept of satisfaction, 
and a defence of the (small-c) catholic faith.  Grotius does reject a necessitarian identical 
satisfaction, in which a repayment is equal to a debt, but like Aquinas, he embraces a 
teleological equivalent satisfaction, in which a punishment fits a crime.  Yet Grotius’s 
catholic theory was predestined not to persuade a wartime Continental audience whose 
centre had not held and which sought definitive distinctions from the Roman church.  His 
attempt to forge a broad middle way would succeed only later in Britain. 
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Grotius’s 1617 De satisfactione Christi is often considered a failure on several counts.  
Composed during the tumultuous 1610s, Grotius sought through it to placate his Counter-
Remonstrant opponents.  Yet Grotius would see little immediate relief of the political and 
physical danger that threatened him; indeed, that peril would only increase.  The Counter-
Remonstrant party would succeed in convening the Synod of Dort, and their political 
allies would greet its conclusion by imprisoning Grotius.  Grotius also sought in De 
satisfactione to demonstrate his fidelity to catholic Christianity, and thus to save his 
reputation from Socinian taint.  In this he was scarcely more successful.  His Counter-
Remonstrant opponents did not cease to charge him with Socinian sympathy; they only 
intensified their charges.  Finally, Grotius surely must have hoped that his Atonement 
theory would gain currency in the Dutch church and beyond.  Yet his theory won few 
adherents in Holland, and scarcely more throughout the Continent.  Few apologists or 
preachers there today rehearse the Governmental theory in preparation to evangelize. 
 If Grotius’s work was a failure in practical terms, perhaps it might be a philosophical 
success as an argument on its intrinsic merits.  Yet here Grotius’s (few) academic readers 
are scarcely more convinced.  Jacqueline Lagrée sees Grotius as failing on account of a 
judicial methodology, one that ostensibly ignores the healing of the soul.  As a result, his 
rigid conception of law and punishment merely looks backward to cancel out sin, rather 
than moving forward to promote virtue.1  Edwin Rabbie, editor of the first English edition 
in a century, describes De satisfactione as ‘brilliant’ and worthy of admiration.  Yet he 
then proceeds to presume his ‘readers will agree with the present consensus of scholars 
that the work is a failure, because it does not prove what it purports to prove.’ He lauds 
Grotius’s ability to fail at such a high level – a backhanded compliment whose praise 
would perhaps resonate better if it did not seem the loudest offered in the mainstream 
literature.2  Hans Blom acknowledges the centrality of the work to Grotius’s oeuvre.  
However, in an agenda-setting argument, he deepens Rabbie’s judgment by arguing that 
the work is not primarily a work of theology, but rather the foundation for a radical 
Enlightenment politics – a position that connotes Locke’s Socinian heterodoxy.  In his 
reading, Grotius severs the connection between offence and punishment, and fails to 
establish punishment by reference to the moral value of faithfulness, thus reducing the 
Atonement to inscrutable Divine mystery.3 
 This essay argues that while Grotius’s work was a failure on the practical count, it was 
not actually a failure on its theoretical merits.  Grotius’s failure owes more to the 
circumstances of his time and to the subtleties of his argument than to the content of his 
theology.  It is indeed possible to read De satisfactione precisely as Grotius adverted: a 
catholic defense of Christ’s satisfaction for human sin.   
                                                
1 Jacqueline Lagrée, ‘Droit et théologie dans le De Satisfactione Christi de Hugo Grotius, in Politique, 
Droit, et Théologie chez Bodin, Grotius et Hobbes, ed. by Luc Foisneau (Paris: Kimé, 1997), pp. 208-12. 
2 Edwin Rabbie, ‘Introduction’, in Hugo Grotius, Defensio Fidei Catholicae de Satisfactione Christi (The 
Satisfaction of Christ), ed. and intro. by Edwin Rabbie, trans. Hotze Mulder (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1990), p. 
2.  As he says, ‘they will still admire the book: it takes a scholar of Grotius’ stature to fail at such a high 
level.’ 
3 Hans W. Blom, ‘Grotius and Socinianism’, in Socinianism and Arminianism: Antitrinitarians, Calvinists, 
and cultural exchange in seventeenth-century Europe, ed. by Jan Rohls and Martin Mulsow (Leiden: Brill, 
2005), pp. 122, 125-6. 
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 What is meant by ‘catholic’?  Early in De satisfactione, Grotius purports to advance 
those beliefs which, ‘as derived from sacred Scripture, the church of Christ has until now 
upheld with unshaken faith.’4  He thus emphasizes as catholic both long usage within 
Christendom and Scriptural foundations.  This understanding of catholicity reflects his 
approach in other works.  For instance, in both Meletius and De veritate, he sets out to 
expound the long-used commonalities between ‘all Christian nations’ (Eastern, Roman, 
and Reformed), rather than adjudicating areas of divergence.  He identifies as catholic 
those doctrines that all three branches can agree on, despite their bitter divisions on other 
matters.5  Moreover, in De imperio, Grotius emphasizes early church foundations by 
praising the early church for its unity and harmony, achieved through a broad latitude on 
inessentials rather than through expanding the realm of orthodoxy on such indifferent 
matters.6  Finally, throughout his corpus he lionizes the early catholic church as a period 
of great learning, and heavily cites harmonizers of faith and reason such as Lactantius, 
Ambrose, Augustine, and John Chrysostom.  Following their example, he provides 
philosophical reasons in De veritate for the possibility of the Resurrection of Christ and 
of the body after death.7 
 To Grotius, the catholic doctrine of the Atonement is that of substitutionary 
atonement.  This doctrine sees human sin as an obstacle to God’s favour.  Such sin 
requires satisfaction through the shedding of blood, in order to make amends and to 
appease God’s wrath against sin.  Christ’s passion and death is that satisfaction for sin: 
‘the punishment of our crimes was exacted of him’.8  In bearing this burden, Christ 
upholds the demonstration of divine justice.  When God accepts this sacrifice, God 
becomes reconciled to humanity, liberating humanity from eternal death, and making 
salvation possible.9  By this standard, both the satisfaction theory of Anselm-Aquinas and 
the penal substitution theory of Calvin are catholic, even though their details differ from 
each other (and from Grotius).  What matters most is their conclusion, in which they 
agree, rather than their intermediate premises, over which they disagree.  By contrast, the 
theory of Socinus is not catholic, because it rejects Christ’s passion and death as 
satisfactory. 
 Thus, despite the idiosyncracies of De satisfactione, its method and content both meet 
Grotius’ test of catholicity.  Grotius may differ from other catholic theories by 
interpreting Scripture through a philosophical-juridical hermeneutic rather than a more 
theological approach.  Nonetheless, this method is not antithetical to catholic Christianity, 
whose many branches throughout time have unwaveringly upheld a Gospel that begins by 
                                                
4 Hugo Grotius, Defensio Fidei Catholicae de Satisfactione Christi (The Satisfaction of Christ), ed. and 
intro. Edwin Rabbie, trans. Hotze Mulder (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1990), I.1, pp. 90-1. 
5 ‘So the difference of opinions that is amongst Christians, cannot hinder their agreement in the principal 
things, that is, those commands, by which we have now recommended the Christian religion: And the 
certainty of these appears from hence, that those who being highly enraged against one another, having 
sought for matter of disagreement, never ventured to go so far as to deny, that these were the precepts of 
Christ.’  Hugo Grotius, The Truth of the Christian Religion, ed. and intro. Maria Rosa Antognazza, trans. 
John LeClerc (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2012), II.17, p. 125. 
6 Hugo Grotius, De Imperio Summarum Potestatum Circa Sacra (On the Power of Sovereigns Concerning 
Religious Affairs), critical edition with introduction, translation, and commentary by Harm-Jan Van Dam 
(Boston: Brill, 2001), V.9, pp. 268-75; VI.9, pp. 308-13; VIII.6, 380-83. 
7 Christian Religion, II.7, pp. 105-6; II.10, pp. 110-3. 
8 De satisfactione, I.59, pp. 128-31. 
9 See De satisfactione, I.2, pp. 90-1; I.39, pp. 114-5; I.59, pp. 128-31; VII.1, pp. 208-9. 
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asserting the harmony of faith and reason.10  Likewise, while one must concede that 
Grotius’s concept of satisfaction is not the Calvinist (and Kantian) deontological-juridical 
conception, in which Christ’s death exactly pays the penalty, it is nonetheless a genuine 
teleological-political conception of satisfaction, in which Christ’s death is the most fitting 
punishment for human redemption.  Grotius’s teleological hermeneutic of fittingness 
rather than necessity is no different than another of the standard catholic theories: that of 
Aquinas.  
 Yet if Grotius’s work is a genuine theoretical defence of the catholic faith, its practical 
failure remains.  Indeed, the grounds for its theoretical success may have helped to 
produce its practical failure.  First, Grotius’s attempt to persuade on a neutral 
philosophical basis, one available to Protestant, Roman Catholic, and perhaps even 
nonbeliever alike, was unlikely to sway any of these groups.  Second, his belief in the 
potential efficacy of the Atonement for the entire church throughout time and space gave 
few rhetorical benefits to a small and distinct Dutch nation.  Finally, his less-tangible 
language of prudence was unlikely to persuade a public seeking precise language of 
necessity for which to fight.  The centre could not hold in the Netherlands (or on the 
Continent), as each side sought unambiguous and definitive distinctions from its 
adversaries in a time of war.  For this reason, Grotius’s attempt to forge a broad middle 
way was successful only in Britain.  It was likely predestined to fail – as Grotius already 
seemed to know – in Continental Europe. 
 
1. De Satisfactione: The Quest for Satisfactory Punishment11 
 
Grotius wrote De satisfactione during a decade personally productive but also politically 
portentous.  The Calvinist-Arminian religio-political conflict was heating up, and Grotius 
did not shrink from the fray.  By 1615, he faced regular charges of Socinianism from the 
Counter-Remonstrant party.  But a study of De satisfactione does far more than to simply 
illustrate Grotius’s historical situation.  Indeed, if Grotius simply meant it as a speech-act 
to rehabilitate his reputation among Calvinists, he chose a rather curious approach: a 
detailed treatise, one referencing jurisprudence, citing pagan sources, and declining to 
engage with Anselm and Calvin.  But this impractical approach permits Grotius to 
explore his philosophy of punishment, which reveals his surprising affinities with the 
catholic tradition that he professes. 
 Grotius begins his theory of the Atonement by reaffirming that Christ does not remove 
human sin, but indeed bears it.  Sin brings a punishment (poena) that cannot be waived, 
although the weight of sin’s burden can be transferred to Christ.12  This punishment for 
human sin cannot be waived because God has created the universe according to this 
necessary and unchanging moral law.  Thus far, these basic premises mark Grotius as 
defending the catholic understanding of substitutionary Atonement, but not yet as 
offering a distinct catholic theory. 
                                                
10 John 1.1: ‘In the beginning was logos, and logos was with God, and logos was God’ (King James 
Version). 
11 See also Jeremy Geddert, Hugo Grotius and the Modern Theology of Freedom: Transcending Natural 
Rights (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 174-82. 
12 De satisfactione, I.20-6, pp. 100-5. 
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 Grotius’s first distinct premise is this: the Atonement is not a matter of civil law, but a 
matter of criminal punishment.  Humanity is not a defendant owing a liability to God the 
plaintiff.  Rather, humanity stands convicted of a crime before God’s moral-political 
government.  Humanity has not taken something from God; rather, humanity has 
offended against God.13  In other words, Grotius employs not the commercial language of 
a payment but the moral language of a crime. 
 Grotius’s second distinct premise follows from the first: God does not hold a private 
relationship to the sinner, as that of an economic creditor, but a public relationship to all 
of humanity, as that of a governor.14  Sin is not simply a matter of an individual having 
offended against God; rather, it is the matter of a human race having sinned against the 
entire moral-political order of which God is ruler.15 
 By framing the Atonement within a public criminal law paradigm rather than a private 
civil law one, Grotius imposes on the right-holder a duty.  If the Atonement were a civil 
law matter of debt repayment, God the creditor would possess a right against the goods of 
the debtor, but no corresponding duty to claim them.  Hence, God could simply release 
the debtor for any reason – or for no reason at all.  (According to Grotius, this is 
Socinus’s position.)  By contrast, in a criminal law case, the right-holder is the governor.  
However, his right is only a right to pursue the pre-existing purposes of punishment.  
Grotius here identifies these purposes as ‘the preservation of order and an example,’16 
and later expands clarifies them in IBP as correction, example, and satisfaction.17 
 For this reason, the governor’s right is in fact a duty to the future of the society that he 
or she governs.  When the wrongdoer commits a crime, he or she does not primarily 
offend against an individual, but against the entire commonwealth.  The harm to the 
public realm explains why the state and not the immediate victim brings the charges.18  
                                                
13 De satisfactione, II.16, pp. 142-3. 
14 De satisfactione, II.1-5, pp. 132-5. 
15 In his fine article ‘Grotius and Socinianism’ Blom reads De satisfactione with sensitivity, notes its 
centrality to Grotius’s jurisprudence, and traces its seeming discrepancies with De Iure Praedae and De 
Iure Belli ac Pacis [= IBP] (see pp. 135-7).  One such apparent discrepancy is Grotius’s insistence in De 
satisfactione, II.5, pp. 134-7 that punishment requires a superior authority, which he appears to jettison in 
the later IBP. In IBP, Grotius states that, prior to the institution of government, every individual not guilty 
of a crime has the natural right (i.e. moral authority) to punish those guilty of that crime, even if the 
punisher and punished share an equalitarian relationship rather than a superior-subordinate one.  Thus, he 
seems to suggest the pre-existence of an informal human moral authority that must be satisfied through 
punishment.  Only after those individuals consensually delegate their natural moral authority to the 
government does the government acquire exclusive punishing authority; only now does the state organize 
and codify the pre-existing human moral authority into a governing authority.  Yet unlike human 
government, God’s government does not come into being through consent; it is more akin to Grotius’s 
parental authority.  There is never a pre-existing condition prior to the institution of Divine government 
(much like a child never exists prior to the punishing authority of his father).  This suggests that the natural 
human moral authority to punish prior to human government is only the right to uphold informal human 
moral authority; there can be no natural human punishing authority to satisfy the integrity of God’s moral 
authority.  For this reason, the insistence on punishment by a superior in De satisfactione need not be 
inconsistent with natural human punishing authority in IBP, because the former speaks of uncreated divine 
government and the latter of consensual human government. 
16 De satisfactione, II.16, pp. 142-3. 
17 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. by Richard Tuck, from the Edition by Jean Barbeyrac [= 
IBP] (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005), II.20.4.1, p. 956; II.20.5.1-3, pp. 959-61; II.20.6.1, p. 963.  
Grotius explicitly rejects as purposes not only revenge but also retribution. 
18 De satisfactione, II.6-2.8, pp. 136-9. 
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Hence, the governor must address the criminal affront to the dignity, integrity, and 
credibility of the political order that he or she is responsible to rebuild and protect going 
forward.  The governor cannot simply waive the punishment.  Should he or she fail to 
redress this affront to the dignity of the law, he or she will encourage other potential 
criminals to act likewise. 
 One might thus conclude that Grotius licenses punishment in order to uphold the 
community.  Yet in doing so, he cannot help but also address the intention of the 
individual.  Unlike debt repayment, which simply requires the debtor to return the goods, 
criminal punishment addresses the criminal’s intention and seeks to change or at least 
deter his or her future objectives.  As Grotius says, ‘the cause of punishment is the 
wrongness of the act, not that anything is lacking to me’ – or presumably that anything is 
lacking to the community.  Hence, when criminal punishment addresses the community’s 
sense of trust, law, and order, it promotes the moral faithfulness of the individual.19  For 
this reason, the treason of the criminal cannot stand: God must testify to the goodness of 
his moral order. Satisfaction is necessary.20 
 Yet satisfaction for a crime differs from satisfaction of a debt.  As Grotius states in 
IBP, satisfaction is not a matter of revenge or even of retribution.  Rather, satisfaction 
seeks to prevent the victim from being disrespected and thus similarly maltreated in the 
future.21  But in this case, the ‘victim’ to be satisfied is not an individual creditor, or even 
the immediate target of the crime.  Rather, as he says in De satisfactione, ‘the order of 
things and the public good function as creditor.’22 
 But how can one satisfy this communal ‘creditor’?  In debt repayment, the debtor 
satisfies the creditor by providing a remedy that is the exact inverse of the liability; in 
fact, it undoes the existing liability.  But in criminal punishment, how can an exact 
punishment ever undo a crime?  A crime is not a thing (such as a debt) that can be 
returned; it is an action that cannot be undone.23 The closest analogue to undoing a crime 
would be the punishment of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.  But this would (in 
the words of Gandhi) only leave the world blind and toothless.  For this reason, 
punishment differs from debt repayment, in which ‘the very nature of the thing 
determines the method and amount’; rather, punishment ‘can only be determined by a 
free act of will.’24 
 Thus, crime (or sin) does not call for identical satisfaction (solutio eiusdem), such as 
the deontological equal and opposite transfer of an object (much less the equal and 
opposite commission of the crime).  Rather, crime calls for equivalent satisfaction 
(solutio tantidem), which we might define as the teleological striving to publicly respect 
                                                
19 De satisfactione, II.10, pp. 138-41.  For a counterpoint, see Blom, ‘Grotius and Socinianism,’ p. 139. 
20 De satisfactione, II.3-5, pp. 132-5; II.13, pp. 140-1; V.15, pp. 182-3.  In this sense, Grotius is consistent 
from De satisfactione to IBP.  For a counterpoint, see Christian Gellinek, Hugo Grotius (Boston: Twayne, 
1983). 
21 IBP II.20.5.1, pp. 959-60; II.20.10.2-7, pp. 977-83. 
22 De satisfactione, II.19, pp.144-5. 
23 Indeed, Grotius’s implicit recognition foreshadows elements of contemporary chaos theory, popularized 
in the example of a butterfly flapping its wings in Brazil and causing a tornado in Texas.  The effect of 
something as small as a butterfly cannot be undone, but only countered. 
24 De satisfactione, II.11, pp. 140-1. 
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and honour the axiological purposes of human moral-political existence.25 Criminal 
satisfaction is not a thing that can be measured with exact correspondence to the crime, 
but an action that carries forward indefinitely to meet the effects of the crime.  
Furthermore, the equivalent satisfaction of criminal punishment does not deal in objects, 
but rather with personal subjects who are never identical from one to another.  This 
personal element renders equivalent satisfaction especially appropriate to the Christian 
for whom the fullest manifestation of truth is not a literal set of objective commands but 
the subjective person of Christ.26  Christ does not issue a new set of commands; rather, he 
personally exemplifies the spirit of the law that underlies the old commands. 
 The third unique premise of Grotius’s theory is this: God’s specific ordinance 
stipulating death as the penalty for human sin is not an act of Creation.  In other words, it 
is not like the aforementioned immutable natural law that sin in general must be 
punished.  Rather, it is a positive ordinance of God as moral Governor of the universe.  It 
is ‘less properly natural’, as it does not partake of necessity, but rather is ‘appropriate’ or 
‘fitting’ (convenientia), as it has a ‘harmony with nature’.27 Such positive ordinances do 
not have an ‘inflexible rectitude’; instead, a different punishment might be ‘very fitting to 
the nature and order of things.’ 
 However, God’s positive law can only be altered (presumably to provide equivalent 
satisfaction) if there is a good cause to do so, and not for any ‘unimportant reason’.28 
Fortunately, the maintenance of God’s government permits – and actually calls for – such 
a dispensation. God’s initial law commanding the death penalty for sin was surely the 
best way to deter sin.  After all, the supreme penalty of death ought to function as the 
strongest possible disincentive toward sin.  However, after Adam’s sin, and the 
consequent sin of the rest of humanity, this high-stakes punishment paradoxically now 
functions as the very worst disincentive.  If every person tainted by original sin now faces 
the gallows, why should anyone act virtuously or practice religion between now and that 
inevitable eternal death?  There would be no relationship between any person’s future 
acts (virtuous or vicious) and their happiness or suffering in the hereafter.29  Of course, 
the person’s virtuous acts and worship of God would still be intrinsically worthwhile.  
But as original sin indicates, intrinsic motives are not perfectly sufficient to motivate 
human action; if it were otherwise, Adam would not have sinned, and there would be no 
need for Atonement in the first place.  Because humans are always at least somewhat 
motivated by extrinsic considerations of punishment, they would thus cease to act 
                                                
25 De satisfactione,VI.16, pp. 196-7; VI.29, pp. 204-5; Edwards A. Park et al, eds., Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. 
23 (London: Trubner and Company, 1879), p. 645.  See also Geddert, Hugo Grotius, pp. 126-8, 183-4. 
26 Indeed, in contrast to the Qur’an, much of Christian Scripture consists not of commandment but of 
history, narrative and parable. 
27 De satisfactione, III.6-3.12, pp. 152-7; See also IBP, Prol. 8, pp. 85-6; Hugo Grotius, letter to Willem de 
Groot, 18 May 1615, in Herbert F. Wright, Some Less Known Works of Hugo Grotius (Leiden: Brill, 1928), 
pp. 208-10, BW I.405 (pp. 389-391). 
28 De satisfactione, III.12, pp. 156-7.  Grotius outlines other reasons to pardon (or not to pardon) in IBP 
(see II.20.4.1, p. 956; II.20.22.1, pp. 996-7; II.20.23-27, pp. 998-1002; II.20.36, pp. 1015-7).  Indeed, as 
Grotius clarifies in De satisfactione, II.16, pp. 142-3, God’s action in the Atonement is that of clemency 
(indulgentia), not liberality (facilitate): it apparently corresponds to Grotius’s second category in De 
Aequitate, not his third. 
29 This argument appears to echo that of Diodotus in Thucydides’ Mytilenean debate. 
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according to virtue and religion if ultimate punishment were guaranteed.30  Hence, if God 
continued to enforce this strict initial law, he would fatally paralyze the workings of his 
own moral government – a result entirely opposite to the purposes of punishment.  This 
ultimate punishment would (ironically) produce the same effect as would the complete 
release from punishment that violates God’s natural law as Creator. 
 Hence, God must determine a punishment that best balances the mathematical 
extremes of absolute punishment and absolute mercy.  (Grotius’s only element of 
deontological necessity is that God must act with teleological prudence: when one says 
that ‘God must do this’, what is properly meant is that ‘it is proper for God to do this’.)31 
How can God find a golden mean that best shows displeasure with sin and yet provides 
hope of salvation?  He does so by prudently ordaining Christ’s substitutionary 
Atonement, which accomplishes both.  On the one hand, when the sinless Christ suffers 
and dies, he shows to humanity the infinite seriousness of sin: ‘Man sees the price that 
matches his sins.’32  (Indeed, Christ’s equivalent satisfaction is no lesser a punishment 
than human damnation would be: while the punishment of one man for many may appear 
quantitatively lesser, the punishment of the Son of God for man is in fact qualitatively far 
greater.  What is relaxed is not the punishment, but the strictness of the law.33)  On the 
other hand, Christ’s substitutionary punishment makes salvation possible for those who 
accept it.34  Hence, God the governor attains the most prudent possible extrinsic balance 
of fear of punishment and hope of gain.  In Grotius’s view, Socinus’ nonsubstitutionary 
theory does not do so. 
 What is more, God the Son’s loving sacrifice also inspires in humanity the best 
possible intrinsic motives for virtue.  Indeed, through Christ, God’s forgiveness now 
becomes an active virtue.  God must do more than simply passively not collect on his 
debt, as in the Socinian conception; God the Son actively deigns to become human, to 
suffer and to die. This active example of divine virtue then inspires active human virtues.  
By adding such intrinsic motives, God also prudently attains the best possible 
maximization of extrinsic and intrinsic motives: the fear of God and the love of God.35 
                                                
30 ‘If eternal death were to fall upon all, religion would totally have perished through despair of happiness.’  
De satisfactione, V.4, pp. 176-7. 
31 De satisfactione, II.17, pp. 142-3. 
32 Hugo Grotius, Meletius, ed. and trans. by Guillaume H. M. Posthumus Meyjes (New York: Brill, 1988), 
§ 47, p. 117. 
33 This echoes Grotius’s statements in IBP II.20.28, pp. 1002-3 and II.20.32, pp. 1010-2 that a governor 
may punish according to desert, which may call for a more severe punishment than that set out in the 
positive law.  Here the strictness of the law is also relaxed, as the punishment does not strictly follow the 
law, but this does not mean that the punishment is thereby lighter.  
34 De satisfactione, V.12, pp. 180-1.  One might point out that De satisfactione is premised on the 
impossibility of full pardon without satisfaction (as Socinus advocates), while IBP and De Aequitate seem 
to differ by taking seriously the idea of pardon.  Yet perhaps even this apparent fundamental divergence is 
not so wide.  De Satisfactione argues that God cannot simply pardon without satisfaction.  Yet in rejecting 
the ‘exact correspondence’ theory it does imply that at least some of the exact punishments will be 
pardoned.  Likewise, IBP and De Aequitate argue the human governor might pardon some criminals from 
punishment – but not all criminals.  When the respective governments of God and man view sin and crime 
as a whole, sin and crime in general must be punished, but not all specific sins and crimes must be 
punished with the specific punishment that they call for.  This enables vicarious punishment, which Grotius 
defends and identifies in both the theological and human realms. 
35 In De satisfactione, IV.21, pp. 170-3, Grotius then further emphasizes the point and widens his audience 
with an example from antiquity.  The ancient Greek lawgiver Zaleucus had mandated a strict law that 
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 Hence, when God provides the best extrinsic and intrinsic motives for future virtue, 
God the governor does not aim to undo sin (or crime), but rather to redeem it.36  He aims 
to inspire future virtue in humanity.  Thus, even Divine punishment must look forward 
rather than backward.37  One might, of course, pause here to ask how Grotius can justify 
hell.  Unlike purgatory, hell is a place of permanent punishment that looks backward and 
thus can never produce virtue and its rewards.  If all punishment is forward-looking, 
would this not compel Grotius to a proto-Unitarian universal salvation?  On the contrary, 
Grotius avoids this conclusion by outlining in IBP one judicious exception to forward-
looking punishment.  This exception is God’s final judgment at the end of time.  At the 
end of time, it becomes unintelligible to look ahead to a temporal future.  Here and only 
here can God punish retributively according to pure desert, rather than punishing to 
promote community integrity and consequent individual faithfulness.  (Indeed, one might 
say that any mathematically retributive punishment already exists outside of time, 
because its deontological dictates are grounded in eternal and person-independent natural 
law rather than in the positive law or prudence that deals with individuals.38)  But 
although this ‘end-of-time’ punishment now looks backward rather than forward and has 
no reference to the future of the community, it need not be inscrutable, because it now 
(finally) follows the necessitarian ‘exact correspondence’ theory.39  In any case, those 
who fail to profess faith in Christ’s Atonement will fail to benefit in the future from his 
satisfaction and example, and at the last judgment must therefore be treated according to 
their inherent sinful desert.  Grotius need not reference this ‘end-of-time’ exception in De 
satisfactione, because he is dealing there with the Atonement of the believing church 
rather than the final judgment of the unbelieving. 
 
2. Aquinas and the catholic Grotius 
 
Many observers understand Grotius to discard catholicity when he departs from the 
‘exact correspondence’ theory.  For instance, Nellen argues that ‘like Socinus, [Grotius] 
could not regard satisfaction as payment in full; but this was the very point on which he 
had set out to refute the heretic.’40  And yet not all catholic Atonement theories – those 
defending the satisfaction of Christ – employ necessitarian language.  In fact, the 
opposite is true.  In particular, Grotius’s theory displays surprising commonalities with 
the most widely-held of the catholic theories both then and now: the “satisfaction” theory. 
 The satisfaction theory originates in Anselm of Canterbury.  According to Anselm, 
divine justice demands that humanity render perpetual honour to God.  When humanity 
                                                                                                                                            
adultery be punished with the loss of both eyes.  When his own son was caught in adultery and brought to 
be blinded, Zaleucus plucked out his son’s first eye, then plucked out one of his own.  Thus ‘he conceded to 
the law the due measure of punishment, while with an admirable tempering of equity he divided himself 
between the merciful father and the just lawgiver.’ What Zaleucus did for the finite crime of one, Christ did 
for the infinite sin of all – or at least all who believe in his substitutionary Atonement. 
36 One might point out that in IBP II.20.7.2-3, pp. 963-5, Grotius permits capital punishment.  Yet even 
here, he seems to justify it according to forward-looking purposes.  See Geddert, Hugo Grotius, p. 124. 
37 For a counterpoint, see Henk Nellen, Hugo Grotius: A Lifelong Struggle for Peace in Church and State, 
1583-1645 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), pp. 237-8. 
38 IBP II.20.4.2, p. 958. 
39 See Blom, ‘Grotius and Socinianism,’ pp. 130, 136. 
40 Nellen, Hugo Grotius, p. 237. 
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sins, humanity fails to do so, and by missing this payment (so to speak), incurs a debt of 
honour.  What is more, these sinful demerits of honour-payment are taken from an 
infinite God, meaning that the debt is infinite.  Humanity cannot repay it, and thus stands 
consigned to a hellish debtor’s prison.  
 Aquinas then further develops the satisfaction theory.  Together with Anselm, he 
argues that Christ – unlike sinful humanity – offers perpetual honour to God.  
Fortunately, Christ also does more than this, by voluntarily submitting to passion and 
death.  In doing so, Aquinas argues that Christ gives to God more honour ‘than what was 
required to compensate for the offense of the human race’, and thus earns infinite 
merits.41  Christ then renounces his own claim on these merits, and God subsequently 
applies this heavenly treasury to the church.  Those who receive the sacraments of the 
church reap this reward, in which Christ’s infinite surplus of merits is applied against 
their infinite debt. 
 The Anselm-Aquinas view appears to be a rather mathematical approach: the merits 
earned by Christ are applied exactly to the demerits of each person who joins the church.  
By comparison, Grotius appears a deviation from a catholic view that (to this point) deals 
in the necessity of mathematics rather than the free will of prudential judgment.  Yet 
Aquinas then introduces an element of that very judgment into what might otherwise 
appear a necessitarian ‘exact correspondence’ theory.  He argues that the passion and 
death of Christ was not, in fact, the only way to atone for sin.  The Atonement was ‘both 
good and befitting the Divine dignity.’  The terms ‘good’ and ‘befitting’ connote not a 
paradigm of deontological necessity but of teleology.  Aquinas continues, ‘other possible 
means were not lacking on God’s part’.  Aquinas even suggests in a Eucharistic hymn 
(‘Adoro te devote’) that one drop of blood from the infinitely perfect Christ would have 
sufficed to atone for human sin.  Nonetheless, if Aquinas does not believe that Christ’s 
death was the only way to save humanity, he does believe that Christ’s passion and death 
was the best or most fitting way to save humanity – and to maintain the ‘divine dignity’ 
so central to Grotius’s aptly-named ‘governmental’ theory.42  In this way, Aquinas 
chooses virtually the same reasoning as Grotius would later employ. 
 Throughout his work, Aquinas repeats this language of fit (conveniens),43 and then 
echoes this distinction between the minimum necessary punishment and the best possible 
one.  In particular, he maps this distinction onto his treatments of necessity and of 
satisfaction.  In regard to necessity, he does so by considering the question of whether it 
was necessary for Christ to become Incarnate in the flesh.  To answer, he first states that 
the term ‘necessary’ can mean two things.  First, a thing is necessary when ‘the end 
cannot be without it’: food is necessary for human survival.  Second, a thing is necessary 
when ‘the end is attained better and more conveniently’: a horse is necessary for a 
journey.44  Only the latter type of necessity applies to the Incarnation.  The Incarnation 
was not the only way to restore human nature, but it was the best way to do so.  It best 
strengthened human faith, hope, and charity; it gave a dignity to embodied humanity; and 
                                                
41 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae [= ST] III, 2nd edn, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1920), Qu. 48.2; 48.4. 
42 Aquinas, ST III, 46.2. 
43 Aquinas, ST III, 1, 50.1. 
44 Aquinas, ST III, 1.2. 
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it showed the Resurrection power of overcoming death.45  It is odd that Aquinas should 
even use the term ‘necessity’ to refer to this category.  Instead of classifying these two 
categories as species of the genus ‘necessity’, he might more easily have distinguished 
two genera: ‘necessity’ and ‘fit’.  Perhaps he does so in order to show the necessity that 
the agent (in this case, God) prudently determine the best fit, much like Grotius would 
argue. 
 Aquinas also uses this distinction between the minimum necessary punishment and the 
best possible one to explore Christ’s satisfaction in the Atonement.  Here he argues that 
only the perfect Christ could offer satisfaction for human sin against God.   Yet ‘God was 
not bound to satisfy’.46  God’s divine economy did not demand Christ’s death as a matter 
of strict necessity; he could have simply consigned all of humanity to eternal perdition.  
But Christ’s death allowed the possibility of eternal felicity, which – while not necessary 
– is surely the most fitting outcome. 
 One might attempt to argue that Aquinas’s non-necessitarian approach paves the way 
for Socinus.  After all, if one avers that Christ’s death is not the exact correspondence to 
human sin, then one could say that Christ’s death was not strictly necessary.  But for 
Aquinas, Christ’s death is yet required by the standards of teleology – a point on which 
Grotius would later agree.  It is only when one takes a non-necessitarian approach, and 
then excises its teleology, that one prepares the way to eliminate satisfaction.47 
 
3. Grotius’s Predestined Practical Failure in Counter-Remonstrant Holland 
 
Grotius’s defence of Christian orthodoxy did not persuade his intellectual or popular 
Counter-Remonstrant adversaries. Holland may have commissioned the young Grotius as 
its official historiographer, but this honour had clearly purchased for Grotius only fleeting 
political and cultural capital.  Grotius shortly found himself on trial, facing execution.  He 
would be officially unwelcome in his home country for the remainder of his life. 
 This rejection of Grotius should not be surprising; it was almost foreordained.  Grotius 
was writing in a country that had only in 1581 declared itself a republic and had only in 
the Twelve Years’ Truce of 1609 won de facto independence from its Catholic Spanish 
masters.  Its sovereign independence would not be assured until the 1648 Peace of 
Münster.  A country with unrecognized rule (and thus unrecognized freedom of 
Protestant practice) was surely in little mood to embrace a position of equivalent 
satisfaction borrowed from Aquinas, whose spirit had permeated the Counter-
Reformational Council of Trent.  On the contrary, a defense of identical satisfaction 
would promote both a catholic position and a stronger distinctiveness from the Roman 
church, thus further asserting a pious yet distinct Dutch identity.  It is not entirely 
surprising that the Synod of Dort was soon followed by renewed hostilities with Spain in 
Bohemia, which helped to precipitate the Thirty Years’ War. 
 In this context, the various principles of Counter-Remonstrant Calvinism were almost 
predestined to defeat their Remonstrant Grotian adversaries in a war of words.  The first 
unpopular Grotian principle was the embrace of the natural virtue of prudence, one he 
shared with Aquinas.  Grotius did agree with the Counter-Remonstrants in rejecting – or 
                                                
45 Aquinas, ST III, 46.3, 50.1. 
46 Aquinas, ST III, 1.2. 
47 For a counter-point, see Nellen, Hugo Grotius, p. 237. 
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at least rejecting as essential – many Thomistic theological developments, such as the 
treasury of merits or venial and mortal sins.  But in De satisfactione, he embraced the 
Aristotelian virtue of prudence so central to Aquinas’s political thought.  Where Aquinas 
had implied this natural virtue in his concept of equivalent satisfaction, Grotius made it 
explicit.  By employing pagan philosophy and natural virtues to supplement his Scriptural 
exegesis, he sought a ground of reason procedurally acceptable and neutral to all, even to 
unbelievers. 
 Yet this embrace of Aristotle would not endear Grotius to his Remonstrant audience.  
Aristotle’s thought had earned deep criticism from Calvin, as well as many an 
antagonistic polemic during the development of Reformed orthodoxy.48  The very 
concept of a natural virtue attainable by natural human effort would be off-putting to 
Grotius’s audience.  But Grotius would further portray God’s prudence as co-equal with 
his love.  This would do even less to commend his argument to an audience for whom 
‘there was no easy alliance between philosophy and theology’.49  Even Gale, the major 
Reformed figure most friendly to philosophy, and one whose method Grotius in some 
ways followed in De veritate, argued that ends of philosophy were inadmissible.50 
 It is true that the Dutch Republic saw a revival of scholasticism during the 
development of Reformed orthodoxy, beginning around the turn of the seventeenth 
century.  Yet this revival refers more to the institutionalization and professionalization of 
Reformed doctrine than to any attempt to reconcile the content of pagan philosophy with 
Christianity.  As Muller notes, ‘the term “scholasticism,” when applied to these efforts 
indicates primarily, therefore, a method and not a particular content’.51  While its chief 
thinkers embraced the methods and logic of scholasticism (and their Aristotelian 
inspiration), they did not embrace Aristotle’s metaphysics or ethics, which were thought 
to be fatally flawed.  Hence, Grotius’s frequent citation of pagan philosophy would not be 
seen favourably as evidence for the universality of proto-Christian themes.  Rather, it 
would be taken as evidence of a prideful belief in philosophy.  What is more, such a 
position could be seen to criticize events such as the iconoclastic 1566 Beeldenstorm that 
had helped to galvanize the Dutch revolt, and thus by extension impugn the founding 
sentiments of the republic. 
 Second, the Counter-Remonstrant doctrine of limited atonement was perhaps also 
predestined to outdo in popularity Grotius’s concept of unlimited atonement in De 
satisfactione.  Grotius sees Christ as bearing punishment on behalf of human sin in 
general, not simply the sin of those individuals elected by God.  This means that all can 
potentially attain salvation, if they will only profess faith in Christ and be baptized into 
the church.  Once again, Grotius may take issue with the specific Roman doctrines of 
penance, purgatory, indulgence, and merits, but he implicitly endorses its idea of 
potential salvation for the entire church.  This could be seen to legitimize the claimed 
                                                
48 R. A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise And Development Of Reformed 
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faith of Roman Catholic masses across Europe, a position unlikely to appeal to Grotius’s 
Counter-Remonstrant opponents.  To them, the Atonement could not be available to all, 
even in a purely theoretical sense; it demands that some people – even perhaps most 
people – must be punished.52  An Atonement theology promising salvation only to a few 
implicitly reinforced the political spirit of a small republic.  By contrast, Grotius’s 
approach (on its face) seemed to give comfort to Roman Christendom, and thus to 
Spanish legitimacy in the low countries. 
 Finally, Calvin’s use of commercial Atonement language was likely to outdo Grotius’s 
political language of equivalent satisfaction.  Calvin speaks of a Christ who ‘paid our 
ransom’ and who ‘purchased…grace for us’, and thus satisfied ‘by that price the justice 
of God.’53  Such formulations may not demand identical satisfaction, but they certainly 
seem to imply it.  What is more, virtually all Reformed orthodox would later avoid 
categorizing the discipline of theology as prudentia, as the Remonstrants had asserted.  
This rejection further de-emphasized the idea of (Aristotelian) prudence even as an 
appropriate method of theology, let alone as central to its content.54  By contrast, Grotius 
speaks of an equivalence ascertained through prudence.  In doing so, he emphasizes a 
concept that is not simple and intuitive, but difficult to define and thus generally less 
persuasive to the casual reader.  The natural mass desire for clarity over subtlety was 
undoubtedly exacerbated in Grotius’s time and place by the wars roiling the Continent.  
When basic survival is threatened, whether physical, psychological or theological, few 
have the inclination to take up positions that naturally form a poor battle cry.  The 
necessitarian idea that Christ paid one’s exact debt or took on one’s exact punishment 
surely feels far more immediately satisfying than the subtlety of a position in which 
Christ suffers as the best (rather than the only) substitute, or one in which he suffers for 
the less tangible sins of ‘humanity in general’.  Such subtlety is not conducive to a wide 
reception in a time of conflict. 
 
4. Grotius’s Successful Reception in Britain 
 
Yet there is one country that avoided these infertile conditions for the Grotian seed: 
Britain.  Only here did the Governmental theory take root.  Grotius’s connections across 
the Channel were widespread.  His visit in 1613 was crucial in helping to establish 
Arminianism in Britain.  During that sojourn he had contact with Lancelot Andrews and 
John Overall, not to mention King James I himself.  Undeterred by their deaths shortly 
after his own exile, Grotius set about cultivating new English connections: Archbishop 
Laud and the Wren brothers. Grotius’s love of Britain was never fully reciprocated, as 
few (other than Laud in 1640) would take risks to help a needy Grotius.55  But Britain 
                                                
52 Luther once remarked that ‘scarcely one human being in a thousand is a true Christian’.  Martin Luther, 
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nonetheless gave Grotius’s Atonement theology a fair hearing.  And if Grotius’s ideas did 
not blossom there into a mighty oak, they did at least produce several brilliant flowers. 
 It is true, of course, that De satisfactione lacked – in Britain as elsewhere – the reach 
of other Atonement theories, such as those of Anselm-Aquinas or Calvin.  Its direct 
lineage was limited by its modest three translations in English.  Yet even these three 
English editions exceeded the combined total in other languages.  Moreover, Latin 
editions of De satisfactione had already appeared in Britain by 1636, predating all other 
Latin editions outside Holland by a century.  England also produced the majority of 
foreign translations of De veritate and the Annotationes.56 
 Likewise, one must concede the paucity of literature on the subsequent history of 
Atonement theology, especially concerning its popular reception.57  Yet it is possible to 
establish a lineage in Britain through three well-studied and influential English 
theologians who adopted Grotius’s theory in part or in full.58  Tracing this theological 
lineage does not simply establish a continuity of Grotian tradition and reception, but also 
shows a connection between the Grotian Atonement and the British ‘middle way’ 
approach, as each of the three figures rejected a strict and ossified concept of tradition yet 
affirmed and preached a Christianity that Grotius would deem ‘catholic’.  This 
historiography also shows a consistent misperception of such nuanced thinkers among 
their contemporary audiences, but unlike on the Continent, not one fatal to their 
continued reception. 
 
Richard Baxter 
 
One of the first prominent English theologians to espouse a form of the governmental 
theory was the seventeenth-century preacher, hymnist, and theologian Richard Baxter 
(1615-91).  Baxter was a Puritan in regard to ecclesiology (if not theology), yet he 
persistently sought a peaceful middle way, while declaring himself (like Grotius) a 
catholic Christian.  He helped to popularize the saying of Grotius’s correspondent de 
Dominis, ‘in fundamentals unity, in non-fundamentals liberty, in all things charity.’59 
Baxter found no joy in the approaching 1642 Civil War, and blamed its cause on 
Parliament no less than the monarchy.  He did ultimately join the Parliamentary army, but 
for an unusual reason: namely, to redirect (from within) its radical republican aims 
toward constitutional monarchy.  Unsurprisingly, he earned enemies on both sides, and 
he ultimately found himself (like Grotius) behind bars.  Yet his influence continued for 
centuries in Britain, as his devotional work was popular for generations, and Max Weber 
cited him extensively to illustrate the Protestant Ethic. 
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 Baxter wrote that he had ‘learnt more from Grotius than from almost any writer that I 
ever read’, and his Atonement theory reflects this patrimony.60  Baxter defines 
satisfaction not in terms of an ‘exact correspondence’ theory, but rather as broadly 
attaining the ends of the law.  Hence, Christ’s death demonstrates justice, and preserves 
the authority of the Divine lawgiver.61  In fact, Baxter implies that only if we see God as 
a governor can we render the Kingdom of God fully intelligible.62  Baxter did later 
respectfully break with Grotius over Grotius’s quest to reunite Christendom through 
Rome (after years of failed efforts through Canterbury).63  Yet Grotius’s hoped-for global 
Christian unity was ironically only an extension of the English unity for which Baxter 
himself had toiled and suffered; Baxter seems to have opposed the plan out of an only-
slightly-incomplete Grotian spirit.64 
 
John Wesley 
 
Perhaps the most famous Grotian sympathizer was the eighteenth-century preacher, 
writer, and church leader John Wesley (1703-91).  Wesley was an itinerant preacher and 
leader of the Great Awakening, although he temporarily split with his co-leader George 
Whitefield over the latter’s belief in predestination.  Like the Puritan Baxter, Wesley was 
uncomfortable with the strictures of Anglican ecclesiology.  Yet also like Baxter, Wesley 
sought an inclusive theological middle way that would unite rather than divide.  He 
eventually reconciled with Whitefield, and preached a sermon at Whitefield’s funeral in 
which he used (and may have coined) the phrase ‘agree to disagree’.65  What is more, 
with his brother Charles he consistently rejected pressure from his followers to leave the 
Anglican communion, and likewise urged his English followers to remain. 
 Although Wesley’s Atonement theology is difficult to pin down conclusively, at 
minimum he sees Christ not simply as atoning God’s wrath but also his justice.  What is 
more, Wesley explicitly states that Christ, in dying, does not suffer the exact punishment 
due to every sinner.  These two ideas are clearly Grotian, so it is not surprising that 
Wesley went out of his way to recommend Grotius to others.66  Indeed, even when 
Wesley hesitates to mandate one specific theory to the exclusion of others, he reflects 
Grotius’s refusal to directly criticize Aquinas or Calvin. 
 Wesley was also highly active in prison reform.  British criminal law and practice 
eventually came to bear marks of his Grotian influence.  British law reflected God’s 
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positive command of damnation: the law was often severe, mandating capital punishment 
for many crimes.  Yet British judges echoed God’s penal relaxation, or what Grotius calls 
‘indulgence’ or ‘moderation’.67  They often applied this law with mercy, offering to 
convicted criminals the alternative of exile to the colonies.  Furthermore, they often 
punished less serious crimes not with hard physical treatment but by employing the 
stocks.  In doing so, they relaxed the pain of physical punishment, but increased the 
public disapprobation of crime – thus testifying to the dignity of the law.68 
 Wesley’s religious descendants in America further carried the torch for the 
Governmental theory, through the intermediary of the New Divinity School of Jonathan 
Edwards, Jr.  Adherents of this school sought a middle way between the Penal 
Substitution theory of Westminster Confession Old Calvinists, and the Moral Influence 
theory of proto-Unitarian Liberals.  Moreover, much like Grotius, they were attacked by 
both sides for doing so.69  This New Divinity school was a natural fit for Wesleyan 
Methodists in the nineteenth century.  Beginning in the 1830s, they often promulgated the 
Governmental theory in their periodicals and propounded it from their pulpits.  By the 
1860s, they had extended the idea of God’s moral government beyond the Atonement, to 
the entirely of God’s work throughout the universe.  Unsurprisingly, this approach has a 
continued lineage today among ‘mediating Methodists’, who seek to balance God’s 
jurisprudence and love, and who embrace Divine mystery over detailed dogma.70 
 
P. T. Forsyth 
 
The Grotian legacy was carried into twentieth-century Britain by P. T. Forsyth (1848-
1921).  Forsyth was described in 1925 by J. K. Mozley as England’s most powerful 
dogmatic theologian, even though Forsyth preferred aphorism and critiqued over-
systematization in theology.  Emil Brunner publicly praised Forsyth as the greatest of 
British theologians (while adopting his Grotian approach to the Atonement).  Karl Barth 
spoke warmly of Forsyth, and transmitted these implicit Grotian themes to his own wide 
audience.71 
 In the Justification of God, Forsyth questions Anselm’s legal-juridical model and 
instead sees the Atonement as redressing ‘the whole moral fabric and movement of the 
universe.’  What calls for redress is not God’s stock of honour, but the rightness of 
things.72  He also places teleology above ‘exact correspondence’ necessity: as one reader 
notes, ‘what fell on [Christ] was not the equivalent punishment of sin but its due 
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condemnation.’73  Yet nor did Forsyth insist that that one type of metaphor could fully 
capture the Atonement.74  Forsyth also echoed Grotius by critiquing of the Council of 
Chalcedon without adhering to the position it outlawed.  Instead, like Grotius he 
protested its process of defining a narrow doctrine, one which produced a schism in the 
church (and one that Patriarch Meletius, honoured by Grotius, later sought to heal). 
 Forsyth’s Grotian affinity resulted in a Grotian-style reception.  Forsyth was critiqued 
by conservative Protestants for embracing historical-critical scholarship and rejecting 
propositional orthodoxy, and by liberals for his emphasis on sin, judgment, and a 
personal encounter with the Revealer.  One might say that he alienated both sides by 
employing the methods of liberalism for the objectives of catholic Christianity, much as 
Jeremy Thomas describes Grotius as having been ‘orthodox for all the wrong reasons’.75 
Furthermore, much like Grotius, Forsyth was charged with being difficult to read, in his 
case because of an aphoristic style born of his suspicion with systematic theology.76  Yet 
his dissemination through theological giants like Barth and Brunner has ensured the 
continuation of his Grotian legacy. 
 
Grotius and the English Way 
 
If this brief survey has shown that England was the country best disposed toward 
Grotius’s theology of punishment, it helps to vindicate recent speculation over Grotius’s 
particular Christian allegiance.  Thomas argues that Grotius ‘probably found the Anglican 
Church…the most attractive’.77  Certainly Grotius’s position on church and state fits the 
Church of England; Grotius expected James I to welcome his Erastian view.  Hugh 
Trevor-Roper more confidently asserts that Grotius was ‘in foro interno [an] Anglican to 
the end’.  He points out that Grotius praised the Anglican liturgy, saying ‘it has always 
been held by all learned men to be the best.’  He also mentions that Grotius advised his 
wife and children to communicate in the Anglican church in Paris, and would have joined 
them himself if not limited by his ambassadorship of Lutheran Sweden.78 
 There are several good reasons why Grotius’s emphasis on the peaceful, nondogmatic 
middle way drew him to the Anglican Way – and why his theological legacy should have 
found a welcome home there.  The English Reformation differed from that of the 
Continent, as it was not initially prompted by doctrinal disputes over justification (and 
thus satisfaction).  Rather, it was motivated more by non-doctrinal issues such as abuse of 
indulgences, Roman oversight, and the Latin mass.  For this reason, it sought not to 
define a narrow doctrine but to accommodate all who professed a broadly catholic 
Christianity – from moderate Calvinists to high church Laudians.  This spirit of Grotian 
catholicity befits its emphasis that truth is discerned in practice more than theory.  For 
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example, the greatest Anglican conflicts have typically not involved doctrine but practice, 
especially the Prayer Book: a liturgy that contains little explicit theology but much that is 
implicit. 
 The Anglican ‘middle way’, with its emphasis on praxis, in turn reflects the broader 
political culture and history of Britain.  One English distinctive is the usage of common 
law rather than Roman civil law.  This approach prioritizes situational discernment over 
universal principles.  Correspondingly, England’s principle of Parliamentary Supremacy 
and its absence of judicial review leads its government to ‘muddle through’ conflicts 
rather than resolving them in black-and-white judicial rulings. As a result, the English 
constitution – like the English garden – develops slowly over time, unlike the planned 
French constitution (and garden).  Likewise, Brits have traditionally fought for the ‘rights 
of Englishmen’ that are won over time (as in Edmund Burke) rather than universal rights 
that descend from on high (as in Thomas Paine).  This concept of rights further buttresses 
the ‘slow but sure’ English approach to change, obviating the need for the many 
revolutions of its Gallic neighbor; Britain’s revolution was Glorious (because peaceful). 
Unsurprisingly, Brits tend to have a more positive attitude toward their government and 
the dignified functions of the monarchy that serve even today as Grotian ‘Protector of the 
Faith’.79  For these reasons, we should not be surprised to find theological descendants of 
Grotius in Britain. 
 
Conclusion: De Satisfactione – Only Satisfying to Grotius’s Posthumous Audience 
 
Grotius’s Atonement theory failed to persuade at least three audiences.  First, it failed to 
persuade his contemporary Counter-Remonstrant adversaries; they viewed it as window-
dressing for Popery or heresy.  Second, his theory has failed to win over scholars today; 
they often see it as a bridge to Socinus.  Nor, finally, did the Governmental theory 
convict pastors or parishioners in Holland, let alone wider Continental Europe; 
congregations there have largely chosen from the stark binary of Anselm-Aquinas or 
Calvin. 
 Yet the theory’s cool reception need not disprove its catholic purport or its defense of 
substitutionary Atonement.  Indeed, its use of methods that can potentially appeal to all 
who consider themselves catholic may have been its very undoing.  First, its lack of clear 
opposition to Roman doctrine may have rendered it less appealing to the Dutch audience 
of the 1610s, offering less implicit support to a nascent Dutch republic independent of 
Spain.  Second, its implicit Thomistic concept of equivalent rather than identical 
satisfaction has led many scholars to overemphasize its affinity with Socinus.  Finally, its 
foundation on a nuanced jurisprudence rather than on clear theology or principles of sola 
scriptura likely rendered it unappealing to congregants in Continental pews.  In short, 
Grotius’s Governmental theory may have been catholic, but it was likely too subtle to 
satisfy many.  Because he declined to use necessitarian language that clearly refuted the 
Roman adversary, his theory may have been ill-suited to a time of war, and thus almost 
predestined to perdition.  Its posthumous salvation came from England, the one country 
largely spared from religious and political strife – although at the time of Grotius’s death 
even Britain would not have looked hopeful.  If Grotius truly ended his life with words 
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about having attempted many things and having accomplished few of them, he could 
have been forgiven for the sentiment. 
 The argument and reception of De satisfactione seems a microcosm of Grotius’s 
tireless (and generally fruitless) lifelong quest for peace.  In his Atonement theology, 
Grotius sought a basis agreeable to all parties, without necessarily forcing either side to 
repudiate their own.  Yet despite reaching out to both sides on a neutral ground, he found 
himself distrusted by both; the more he defended himself from ‘Socinianism’ or ‘Popery’ 
(and the more he declined their enticing offers), the more he became accused of both.80 
While he sought a peaceful middle way, his opponents found it easier to divide and 
conquer.  His rivals’ strategy was well-suited to a public that sought tangible, intuitive 
doctrines; indeed, their emphasis on the language of necessity rather than prudence is 
often a winner even today.81  Few audiences embrace Grotius’s emphasis on diversity in 
inessentials, or his belief in the inability of words to fully convey the mystery of Christ – 
a man Divine but never fully defined. Yet perhaps Grotius employs such nuance not to 
disingenuously enable heterodoxy but rather to prevent catholic Christianity from 
becoming ossified into brittle propositional dogma.  Much like Christ’s death permits a 
prudent alteration of God’s original (positive) command, Grotius’s emphasis on practice 
over doctrine points toward a transcendent and personal God who acts – in the words of 
De satisfactione – ‘not according to the law, yet not against it; but rather, above the law, 
and instead of it.’82  Only in a more pacific context, one more amenable to careful and 
subtle philosophical inquiry, could this delicate and long-germinating Atonement theory 
begin to flower. 
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